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Abstract 
We estimate the causal effect of food standards on Vietnamese pangasius farmers’ 
wellbeing measured by per capita consumption expenditure. We estimate both the 
average effects and the local average treatment effects on poorer and richer farmers by 
instrumental variable quantile regression. Our results indicate that large returns can be 
accrued from food standards, but only for the upper middle-class farmers, i.e., those 
between the 50% and 85% quantiles of the expenditure distribution. Overall, our result 
points to an exclusionary impact of standards for the poorest farmers while the richest do 
not apply standards because the added gain is too small.  
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1. Introduction 
To participate in global value chains producers need to fulfill requirements of food 
quality and safety regulation of destination markets. Typically, it is not sufficient to 
comply with the public regulation in the destination countries as foreign market access 
depends on the ability of exporters to follow private or voluntary food standards.1 The 
impact of food standards on the wellbeing of farmers in developing countries has been 
debated intensively, as the effect may be both positive and negative. Introduction of 
voluntary standards in a particular agri-food sector is associated with high compliance 
costs for farmers and this may marginalize the poorest (Henson & Jaffee, 2008; Reardon, 
Barrett, Berdegué, & Swinnen, 2009). Food standards may also induce negative 
externality effects on poor farmers because the inability to comply with food safety and 
quality standards can result in selling to unprofitable markets (Reardon & Farina, 2002). 
However, it is similarly possible for small-scale producers to benefit from food standards. 
Application of standards can reduce rural poverty because of increased local demand 
(Maertens & Swinnen, 2009) and farmers who succeed in complying with private 
standards can benefit through several channels, either (i) higher net production revenues 
(Asfaw, Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2010b), (ii) better employment conditions, such as higher 
wages and longer employment periods (Colen, Maertens, & Swinnen, 2012), or (iii) 
better production practices and health (Asfaw, Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2010a).  
 
In analyzing the direct impact of food standards on farmers’ livelihoods, most of the 
literature has focused on average impacts. While the average gain from standards is 
surely interesting, there is, in our view, a case for believing that the gain is unevenly 
distributed across households of different socio-economic status. First of all, we argue 
that in rural markets with credit constraints or high financing costs due to information 
asymmetries, a positive impact of standards is only attributable to farmers in the upper 
segments of the income or wealth distribution because of excessive financing costs for 
the poorer farmers. This argument is based on findings in previous studies that show how 
adoption of standards is to a large extent determined by households’ endowments of 
capital, resulting in a wealth threshold above which application of standards becomes 
1 For an overview of categories of food standards, see Henson and Humphrey (2010) 
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beneficial (see, e.g. Asfaw et al., 2010b; Kersting & Wollni, 2012). Similarly, Neven et 
al. (2009) report a restraining capital vector for entrance into the supermarket supply 
chain in Kenya. Their results illustrate that the key suppliers of Kenyan supermarkets are 
medium-sized, fast-growing commercial farms that hinder participation of small farms 
and institute the new middle-class. Based on these observations, we believe that obtaining 
evidence on the impact of standards at different welfare levels can assist in better 
agricultural policy design.  
 
The decision to adopt food standards can be framed as a case of new technology 
adoption. Underpinned by concerns about economic growth and poverty reduction, 
technology adoption models have analyzed how new plant varieties or production 
techniques are adopted by farmers (Conley & Udry, 2010; Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995; 
Suri, 2011). However, just as for the food standards literature, a focus on mean impact 
has left out the possibility of heterogeneous wealth impacts in the adoption of new 
technologies. We therefore believe our analysis of the distribution of the gain from 
applying food standards on farmers’ wellbeing is also contributing to the technology 
adoption literature.  
 
We estimate the distributional impact of food standards on consumption expenditure 
using an original dataset from the Vietnamese pangasius value chain.2 To overcome the 
pervasive endogeneity problems present in this kind of impact estimations with 
substantial self-selection we use an instrumental variable quantile regression model 
developed by Abadie et al. (2002) to estimate the causal effect of food standards on 
farmers in selected expenditure quantiles. In order to substantiate our econometric 
findings and further enrich our understanding of the farmer’s situation and decision 
problem, we complement the statistical analysis with insights from our price data and 
qualitative interviews with key stakeholders. 
 
2 Other commercial names are also used for pangasius, such as catfish, basa, swai, iridescent shark and 
sutchi.  
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The results of our study can be summarized as follows. We find a positive average impact 
of food standards on household wellbeing: applying standards leads to an average 
increase in monthly per capita consumption expenditure of about 50% in our most 
conservative specification. When we allow for varying impacts across the expenditure 
distribution, we find small and insignificant effects for the poorest half while there are 
large positive effects for the upper middle-class, defined as households from around the 
median of the distribution and upwards, but excluding the upper 10-15% tail. The gain 
for the upper middle-class is an increase in consumption expenditure of around 65% in 
our most conservative estimation. While the insignificant impact of standards on the 
poorest half of the farmers is clearly the main result, the insignificant impact of adopting 
standards for the 10-15% wealthiest farmers is also interesting and we argue that the 
finding is not simply a statistical coincidence. The estimated distribution of the impact of 
adoption of standards is the outcome of two different conditions: (i) For the poorest 
farmers there is no gain because of the high costs of financing the investment, and (ii) For 
the wealthiest farmers there is no gain because they are already able to get high prices on 
their fish, partly because they produce fish of high quality and partly because they have 
good working relations with the processors. The overall outcome is that application of 
food standards in the Vietnamese pangasius sector is benefitting the upper middle-class 
directly, while the benefits for the poorer segment are either absent or, at best, second 
order labor market effects as described in Maertens and Swinnen (2009) and Colen et al. 
(2012). 
 
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we briefly review relevant literature on 
the impact of standards in developing countries. In Section 3, we describe the Vietnamese 
pangasius sector and provide a brief review of trends in food safety standards. 
Section 4 presents the survey data and key descriptive statistics, while Section 5 lays out 
our econometric approach to estimating the welfare impact of food standards and shows 
the results. We discuss and compare our results with previous studies in Section 6, while 
we offer a brief conclusion in Section 7. 
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 2. Standards in developing countries 
The literature suggests that the effects of standards on smallholder producers from 
developing countries are ambiguous. In an overview of the literature on smallholder 
participation in high-standards export sectors in Africa, Maertens et al. (2012) conclude 
that the impact of standards is both sector- and country-specific. An important concern is 
that standards contribute to exclusion of the poorest farmers who, due to weak managerial 
and capital endowments, fail to comply with strict requirements. The costs of 
implementing standards at the farm level vary across individual farmers, products, sectors 
and geographical location, as conditioned by economies of scale or location-specific 
factors. Further, non-compliance with standards is linked with exclusion of farmers from 
high-value export sectors and higher inequality in several studies (Farina & Reardon, 
2000; Reardon, Codron, Busch, Bingen, & Harris, 1999).  
 
Conversely, standards can improve the financial position of farmers who succeed in 
complying with standards (Giovannucci & Ponte, 2005; Maertens & Swinnen, 2009; 
Reardon et al., 2009). After the initial investments, standards can bring positive financial 
returns to farmers as they improve access to (and the survival in) new markets, quality 
and safety product attributes and competitiveness (Henson & Reardon, 2005; Reardon et 
al., 1999). The key determinants of the farmers’ ability to comply with standards are 
establishment size, ownership of production and household assets, social capital, 
information access and external assistance (Asfaw et al., 2010b; Henson, Masakure, & 
Cranfield, 2011; Kersting & Wollni, 2012; Reardon et al., 2009). Previous studies have 
shown a significant relationship between adoption of standards and farm size, the level of 
physical, social and human capital, weak credit access and isolation from producer 
associations (Asfaw et al., 2010b; Narrod et al., 2009; Okello & Swinton, 2007). Thus, it 
is typically the better-off farmers who apply standards. Similar results hold for the 
inclusion of smallholders in retail marketing channels and contract farming schemes (Key 
& Runsten, 1999; Neven et al., 2009; Reardon et al., 2009).  
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Previous studies of the impact of standards on rural households mainly focus on average 
effects, thus failing to identify the exact wealth interval at which the impact of standards 
becomes significant. A somewhat comparable strand of literature on poverty 
interventions in developing countries shows that the effect of development interventions 
is usually heterogeneous, i.e., some groups benefit more than others. For example 
conditional cash transfers do not have the same effect on different income groups 
(Galiani & McEwan, 2013) and richer households tend to benefit more from rural 
infrastructure improvements than poorer ones (Khandker, Samad, Ali, & Barnes, 2012). 
Benefits from participating in high-value export sectors are usually reserved for wealthier 
households, whether through choosing better marketing channels or contracts (Key & 
Runsten, 1999; Minten, Randrianarison, & Swinnen, 2009; Neven et al., 2009; Rao & 
Qaim, 2011). Furthermore, poor farm-households in developing countries exit export 
sectors while large companies and developing country elites appropriate rents in export 
value chains (Reardon et al., 1999). These examples illustrate that it is of critical 
importance to assess the effect of standards at different welfare levels as failing to do so 
could discount the potential effect of standards on inequality in rural areas.  
 
3. The pangasius sector in Vietnam 
The Vietnamese pangasius sector started developing from household farms that cultivated 
freshwater species Pangasius bocourti (Mekong catfish, ca basa in Vietnamese) and 
Pangasianodon hypophthalmus (striped catfish, ca tra) in the Mekong River Delta 
(MRD). These species have been farmed in cages and small ponds since the beginning of 
the 1960s. Over the last decade the farming of striped catfish has taken primacy over the 
basa variety as it proved easier to spawn and faster growing. In addition, its quality 
attributes are better (Phuong & Oanh, 2010), and now it accounts for almost all of farmed 
pangasius in Vietnam. 
(a) Production and export 
Pangasius was first exported at the beginning of the 1990s, to Australia. Soon after that, 
Asian countries, the US, and the EU followed (Tuan, 2003). Starting in 2007, new 
markets emerged, notably Russia and Ukraine, but also South America and the Middle 
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East. With global proliferation of food quality and safety standards, the choice of export 
destination depends on product quality whereby the certified, highest quality products are 
sold in Western markets. 
 
Vietnamese production of pangasius grew from 40,000 metric ton in 1997 to over one 
billion metric ton in 2009 (FAO, 2012). In terms of production, pangasius accounted for 
more than 40% of Vietnam’s total aquaculture value, with a farm-gate value of almost 
two USD billion in 2008 (FAO, 2010). The average annual growth rate in value terms 
was 37% in the period 1997-2008. A record growth of 63% was marked between 2006 
and 2007, while production output and value decreased by 16% between 2008 and 2009 
(Figure 1). The export value decreased by 7.5% while export quantity decreased by 5% in 
the same year.  
 
 
Figure 1. Quantity and value of pangasius export 2000-2010  
Source: Nguyen (2010) and Dzung (2011) 
 
The export decline coupled with fluctuations in input and farm-gate prices brought 
financial difficulties to pangasius farmers. It is believed that about 70% of all pangasius 
farmers had negative returns in 2009 (Belton, Little, & Sinh, 2011) and depending on 
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location, between 30% and 50% of pangasius farmers have stopped producing since 2009 
(Vietnamnews, 2011; Vina Seafood, 2009). To cope with the losses in production, some 
farmers started to lease or sell their ponds to processing companies while others moved to 
wage labor on other farms, or to agriculture. Some farmers would occasionally shift to 
fingerling production or production of fish species that are demanded in the domestic 
market. The fluctuations in demand for pangasius, partly coupled with high levels of 
uncertainty in retail markets are brought by claims about poor quality of the fish and 
unsustainable production practices in European media and NGO initiatives (Bush & 
Duijf, 2011). As a response to tight market conditions, the pangasius sector has seen a 
spread of quality and safety standards both at the farm and the processor level.  
(b) Value chain, product quality and standards 
Ensuring satisfactory product quality and safety requires close monitoring of activities 
during primary production and processing. Two approaches of retailers and international 
traders can be observed in this regard. The first approach is seen with retailers and traders 
who have developed their own internal standards and certification schemes, which 
include visits at production and processing sites and quality inspection of products. The 
second approach is seen with retailers who require that producers and processors obtain 
internationally recognized certificates through systems such as GlobalGAP, BAP or 
BRC. 3 In this case, certification substitutes for the active involvement of retailers in 
production and distribution monitoring.  
 
Standards such as GlobalGAP and BAP have primacy at the farm-level of the pangasius 
value chain. GlobalGAP is presently the leading certification system in continental 
Europe, while retail chains in the US, Canada and UK favor BAP certification. In 
Vietnam, some 45% of the pangasius farming area (2,805 ha) is certified (VASEP, 2011). 
There are currently 49 enterprises with GlobalGAP certification, while 103 farms have 
been, or are being, certified by different sustainability standards. Two pangasius 
processing plants, one farm and one feed supplier are BAP certified (GAA, 2011). 
 
3 GlobalGAP: The Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice, previously known as EurepGAP; 
BAP: Best Aquaculture Practices; BRC: British Retail Consortium Global Standard for Food Safety. 
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In the pangasius value chain the process of exchange starts by the orders received from 
buyers, primarily foreign retailers, who communicate their purchase specifications to 
international traders, wholesalers, or directly to processing companies. In fulfilling 
orders, processors opt for sourcing from own farms (estate farms) or from contract farms. 
Alternatively, farmers inform processors that they have particular quantity of fish to sell. 
Production on estate farms allows for the greatest degree of control over production 
methods. By sourcing the fish from multiple parties, processing companies can supply a 
range of qualities and prices, while ensuring an ability to flexibly respond to changes in 
demand over time.  
 
As sales of pangasius to processing companies are not conditioned by compliance with 
standards, both spot-market purchases from independent farmers and contract production 
involve product testing for quality and safety verification. Technicians employed by 
processing companies check the quality and safety of unprocessed fish at the farm and 
based on the inspection results the company decides whether to complete the purchase. 
The quality inspections consist of size and flesh color checks, while the safety inspections 
include tests for the presence of antibiotic residues and fish diseases. At this point, the 
farmgate price is determined, reflecting the overall quality parameters of fish. The fish is 
tested again at the point of delivery to the processing plant. Just after the processing and 
before they are shipped abroad, products are inspected by the authorities (NAFIQAVED 
– National Fisheries Quality Assurance and Veterinary Directorate). In case a processing 
company sells to any of the retail chains it is customary for retailers to pay visits to 
processing facilities and farms to inspect not only the final product but also the 
production process. Guided by commercial concerns about their marketing image, 
retailers are found to be regulating the nature of processes upstream in the value chain.  
 
In line with the new regulation on environmental protection in Vietnam, farms that 
supply pangasius have to be located in areas designated for aquaculture so processors in 
principle give advantage to such farms. Among other factors that determine the supplier 
choice, quality and food safety requirements of consumers translated into retailers’ 
specifications play a prominent role. Export markets such as the EU and the US impose 
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very strict safety and quality requirements for imported products (Jaffee & Masakure, 
2005). In addition to regulation on microbiological contamination and chemical residues, 
such as residues of veterinary drugs, actors in these markets are requesting that the fish be 
farmed in a way that is respectful for the environment, workers, and their communities. A 
failure to follow quality and safety regulation of export markets results in product 
detention or rejection at the border after which the consignment is destroyed or 
dispatched to a less demanding market, at the exporter’s expense. Restrictiveness is not 
so high in the Asian, Middle-Eastern, and Eastern European markets, but it is still judged 
to be more rigorous than the Vietnamese domestic market.  
 
In conjunction with the implementation of standards, processing companies have a 
traceability system implemented on their farms and they also engage own technicians to 
implement traceability systems on contract farms. The tracing records identify not only 
the farmers who supplied the unprocessed fish but also all the input sources, input use, 
and disease treatments administered at the farm. Any problems detected at the retail level 
can in this way be traced to the farmer.  
(c) On-farm requirements for application of standards 
The application of standards on farms entails ensuring compliance with national 
legislation and specific food quality and safety regulation of export markets. Farmers 
need to establish traceability on their farm, which means that they have documentation 
for all farm inputs. The production technology also varies with the application/non-
application of standards. Specifically, the technology is more demanding when standards 
are applied, as farms applying standards must have sedimentation basins, which serve to 
collect sludge from fishponds before the effluent is released from the farm. The size of 
sedimentation basins must be around 20% of production area, implying lower output per 
land unit (all else equal). Due to increased complexity, the amount of labor spent on 
farming and the use of other farm inputs also differ with the application/non-application 
of standards. Farmers need to attend trainings or hire qualified personnel and consultants 
who will advise them about standards and train farm workers. Furthermore, when 
producing under standards, farmers must pay more attention to the production inputs 
because they need to comply with requirements of the standard: better feed and 
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fingerlings, purchased from a certified supplier, and approved medicines and cleaning 
agents. 4  There are also different variable costs because production under standards 
requires inspection of inputs and intensive record keeping, maintenance of cleaning and 
disinfection schedules, and specialist application of medicines. In addition, after 
successful implementation of standards, farmers can opt for certification, which requires 
auditing through a third party, where as a rule the producer has to bear the full cost.  
 
Despite the changes in input requirements for land, labor, and intermediate inputs it is not 
certain that productivity decreases because the implementation of standards entails 
improved management of the production process as farmers use improved inputs and 
technologies, which in turn can lead to less disease occurrence, higher-quality products, 
and, thus, less product rejection from processors.  
 
Implementation of standards requires initial investment in equipment and modifications 
on farms (e.g., sludge aerators, ﬁlters, drainage equipment or sedimentation basins) 
whereby farmers incur a specific cost when they switch from traditional production to 
standards. The initial costs are often too large to be financed by retained earnings or other 
accumulated income and the processors do not provide loans or credit for the investment. 
Hence, the credit market will influence the decision to adopt standards and the net gain 
from the adoption. Even though the application of standards puts the financial pressure on 
pangasius farmers, there are no mechanisms to guarantee price premium for standards 
(Belton, Haque, Little, & Sinh, 2011). Instead, the overall quality assessment of fish is 
what determines the farmgate price.  
 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our data have been obtained through qualitative interviews, a farmer survey, field 
observations, and published secondary material. The qualitative interviews included 52 
informants with knowledge of the pangasius industry. The informants were selected using 
4 Khoi (2011) describes in detail how inputs change and production costs increase with the application of 
standards in pangasius production. That the approved inputs are more costly is also described elsewhere 
(see, e.g. Asfaw, Mithöfer, & Waibel, 2010b). 
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snowball sampling where the first interviewees came from research institutions and 
government offices.5 An overview of the interviewees and criteria used for selection are 
available in Table A1 in the Appendix. The support from local research institutions and 
the provincial Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development  (MARD) offices was 
crucial for reaching farmers and processing companies. All field visits were conducted in 
the presence of local researchers and MARD staff employed at province or commune 
level, which is necessary when doing field research in Vietnam, as noted in several 
studies (Belton, Little, et al., 2011; Scott, Miller, & Lloyd, 2006). The interview format 
was semi-structured in most of the cases and based on open-ended questions. As dictated 
by the circumstances and respondents’ preferences, two of the qualitative interviews were 
informal and 12 included information gathering through e-mail exchange. The interviews 
were led in English and in Vietnamese assisted by an interpreter when a respondent did 
not speak English. Only two interviews could be recorded and these were later 
transcribed. In all other cases we relied on note taking. The interview guide contained 
sections on organization and performance of the pangasius value chain, certification of 
standards and public regulation, production ownership and institutional framework. 
Trends and dynamics related to production, processing and export were also emphasized. 
The interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes depending on the respondent.  
 
The farmer survey took place from April to June 2011 in three provinces in the MRD that 
have a high intensity of pangasius production: Can Tho, Dong Thap and An Giang.6 The 
survey included 276 pangasius farmers, however, as not all households wanted to reveal 
all wealth-related information our analysis includes only 270 households. We do not 
consider 6 out of 276 households (2%) to be a serious non-response rate.  
 
5 The informants can be classified according to the following categories: input and service suppliers, 
farmers, processing companies, exporters, government representatives, and researchers. Informants were 
selected primarily based on their function in the value chain. Choosing the informants based on location 
was not highly relevant because several functions are performed outside or across the study provinces. For 
example, most of the service providers and exporters operate in all provinces in the Mekong River Delta, 
but their main offices are based in Ho Chi Minh City, the largest city in the area. When the interviews were 
performed in Ho Chi Minh City, it was made clear to the interviewees that the questions were aimed at 
obtaining the information about An Giang, Can Tho and Dong Thap provinces.  
6 These three provinces comprise 70% of total pangasius production in Vietnam (VASEP, 2012). 
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The sampling of farmers for the survey was done in stages, as a complete list of 
pangasius farmers does not exist. The total number of pangasius farmers in Vietnam was 
estimated to be around 2,000 while the exact number for the three provinces included in 
the survey was unknown.7 The sampling started by a random selection of 25 communes 
from Dong Thap province. The aim was to collect data from all pangasius farmers in each 
of the 25 communes. In the second stage, at the commune level, we relied on commune 
staff to access farmers as the official lists of pangasius farmers did not exist. In total, we 
surveyed 197 farms in Dong Thap. Given the lack of official lists we cannot tell precisely 
if there were more than 197 pangasius farms in operation in the 25 communes in Dong 
Thap in 2010. Combining information from the 2006 Agricultural Census and local 
MARD offices the number of pangasius farmers in the selected communes was estimated 
to be 254 in 2010 so we may only have reached 78%. But given the high fluctuation in 
the number of pangasius farmers (Belton, Little, et al., 2011), 254 farms may well be an 
upper bound rather than a precise number. Furthermore, as pangasius farmers are located 
in clusters and the commune staff differed by commune, we do not anticipate any 
systematic sample selection problems.     
 
In An Giang we also selected communes randomly in the first stage, however, we were 
only able to visit 3 communes and interview 54 farmers. As in Dong Thap province, the 
aim was to sample all pangasius farmers in each commune and, again, we had no official 
lists of the total number of farms in the three communes or any reason to expect 
systematic sample selection problems at the commune level. Finally, to enlarge the 
sample in the econometric analysis we included farmers who were surveyed during the 
testing phase. Thus we also included 25 pangasius farms from two randomly selected 
communes in Can Tho.  
 
7 While the total number of pangasius farmers was estimated to be around 4,500 in 2009 (SFP, 2012), there 
were strong indications that this was not the case at the time of the survey. First, the general perception was 
that between 30 and 50% of pangasius farmers had stopped producing since 2009 (Vietnamnews, 2011; 
Vina Seafood, 2009). Second, an interviewed industry expert estimated that the number of farmers was 
around 2,000 in 2011. Also, during the field visits, it was mentioned in all of the visited sites that the 
number of pangasius farmers had been declining. 
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The total sample of 270 farms thus forms a random sample of the pangasius farmers in 
the MRD, but it is not possible to compute sampling weights to obtain results for the 
pangasius farm sector as such. As we look at the gain from adoption of food standards we 
do not consider this to be a major problem, but it must be borne in mind when 
considering the external validity of our analysis. 
(a) Farm characteristics and benefits from standards 
The questionnaire for the survey contain questions on key socio-economic indicators, 
particularly income and consumption expenditure; production inputs, assets and costs; 
marketing and support institutions; contract details; application of standards, and 
perceptions about the pangasius sector. The questions refer to the household situation in 
2010. In the consumption expenditure module we cover the same questions as in the 
national Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS), which are akin to the 
Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) questionnaires used by the Government 
of Vietnam and several research institutions for assessment of poverty and consumption-
based wellbeing in Vietnam. Details about the main variables we construct from the 
questionnaire are given in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
 
Table 1 gives information about the prevalence of standards for the whole sample by 
ownership type and by province. In addition, we describe the farm size distribution and 
the adoption of standards within the size distribution. In our sample, 87 of the farms 
(32%) are estate farms while the remaining 183 are traditional household-owned and 
operated farms. In relation to standards, it is interesting to note that a much larger fraction 
of the estate farms applies standards: 35% compared to only 20% of the household farms. 
This implies that almost half (46%) of the farms applying standards are estate farms. It is 
equally interesting that also among the estate farms a large majority does not apply 
standards, such that they constitute 28% of the non-adopters. Thus, even though 
processors encourage application of standards to secure the Western export markets they 
own and invest in farms that produce fish that cannot be sold in these markets. 
 
The size distribution of farms illustrates a highly skewed distribution with more than half 
of the farms having a small aquaculture area (less than 1 hectare) and about 20% of the 
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farms being above 3 hectares. In terms of application of standards we note a significant 
difference between household-owned and estate farms in that the typical household-
owned farm with standards is small while the typical estate farm with standards is large.  
 
Table 1. Prevalence of standards among pangasius farms 
 Whole 
sample 
 Farms that 
apply 
standards 
 Distribution of farms by 
size 
 Farms that apply 
standards by farm size 
 (n)  (n) (%)  
<1 
ha 
(n) 
1 – 3 
ha 
(n) 
>3 
ha 
(n)  
<1 
ha 
(n) 
1 – 3 
ha 
(n) 
>3  
ha 
(n) 
Farm ownership 270  68 25.19  154 60 55  31 17 20 
Household-owned 183  37 20.22  129 35 19  22 12 3 
Estate farms 87  31 35.63  25 25 36  9 5 17 
Source: Farmer survey. 
 
Table 2 presents averages of key household and farm characteristics, both for all farmers 
in the sample and by application of standards. When the difference between the two sub-
sample averages is significantly different from zero (evaluated by standard t-test), we 
mark the mean for the group that applies standards by asterisks. The Table shows that 68 
of the 270 farmers (25%) apply standards. 8 We do not distinguish between different 
standards, as the options are limited: Pangasius farmers could choose between 
GlobalGAP, BAP and SQF 1000 at the time of survey. 9  Moreover, the distinction 
between various standards is not absolutely necessary because all of the mentioned 
standards focus on food safety and have similar requirements for farmers. The main 
reasons given for not adopting standards were lack of competences (20%) and high costs 
(17%). This observation is in line with other global value chains, notably the green bean 
8 Four farmers stated that they apply standards, but they were not certified so they were excluded from the 
analysis. Complying only with the EU, US or Vietnamese public regulation was not considered equal to 
complying with private standards for the purpose of this study. None of the farmers stated that they comply 
with more than one standard. As only four farmers are in the process of obtaining a certificate, it was not 
considered relevant for this study to explore differences between simple application and certification of 
standards.  
9 SQF 1000 is short for Safe Quality Food – a standard for primary producers developed by the Safe 
Quality Institute. All of the standards applied in the Vietnamese pangasius sector focus to some extent on 
the issues of water use and quality, biodiversity, feed quality, fish health and welfare, worker pay and 
conditions, worker health and safety, product quality and traceability (Belton, Haque, Little, & Sinh, 2011). 
Among the surveyed farmers, 74% stated that they apply GlobalGAP. Therefore, we do not consider it 
important for this study to explore the effect of applying different types of standards.  
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export sector in Kenya, where the number of smallholders has decreased due to their 
inability to finance compliance with food standards (Okello & Swinton, 2007).  
 
Table 2. Average household and farm characteristics and average differences between 
pangasius farms by application of food standards  
Variables  Measure  N Whole 
sample 
No 
standards 
Applying 
standards 
Consumption expenditure, paea  VND million 270 6.48 6.30 6.99 
Per capita yearly expenditure VND million 270 5.07 4.94 5.45 
Yearly household expenditure  VND million 270 17.87 17.25 19.69 
Households in the sample Number  270 270 202 68 
Household size Persons 270 3.74 3.72 3.78 
Dependency ratio Percent  270 35 36.94 29.22 
Age of the farm operator Years 270 42.29 42.30 42.28 
Years of schooling Years 270 9.07 8.77 9.98** 
Farm size  Hectare 270 3.14 2.94 3.73 
Aquaculture area Hectare 269 2.64 2.32 3.57** 
Household labor  Persons 270 2.11 2.16 2.09 
Household labor share Percent  270 63.06 63.85 60.73 
Off-farm employment  Percent  270 30 32.17 20.59** 
Distance to buyer Kilometer  270 24.18 23.31 26.80 
Own means of transport Percent  270 94.07 93.06 97.06 
Estate farm Percent  270 32.22 27.72 45.59*** 
Contract with a processing 
company 
Percent 270 31.11 27.23 42.65*** 
Note: VND is Vietnamese Dong: 1 USD ≈ 20.500 VND. Differences in characteristics of farms relative to 
application of standards are tested using t-test. Significant differences are indicated by * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05 and *** p < 0.01. a pae is per adult equivalent. Source: Farmer survey. 
 
The first row in Table 2 reports our measure of wellbeing: consumption expenditure per 
adult equivalent.10 The average pangasius farmer is not poor by Vietnamese standards, 
but the consumption level is not far above the poverty line, when judged by the revised 
poverty line of 4.8 VND million applied for 2011 to 2015 (MOLISA, 2011). The median 
farm household is actually just about the poverty line for 2005-2010 and clearly below 
10 We use the OECD (2009) adult equivalent scale: 1 for the first adult, 0.7 for additional adults in the 
household and 0.5 for each child in the household. 
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the revised poverty line for 2011-2015.11 Average consumption is slightly higher for 
farms applying standards but the difference in means is not statistically significant.  
 
Table 2 shows that for typical household demographics such as household size, 
dependency ratio, and age of the farm operator we find a reasonable agreement with 
average household characteristics, as given in the 2010 VHLSS (GSO, 2011) and there 
are no differences in these characteristics across farms applying and not applying 
standards.12 It is therefore noteworthy that the educational level of the farm operator 
differs significantly between adopters and non-adopters of standards. The average farm 
operator who adopts standards has more than one extra year of schooling compared to the 
average non-adopter. 
 
The average total farm size is just above 3 hectares, with a somewhat larger average size 
for the farms that apply standards, although the difference is not statistically significant. 
The area used for aquaculture is, however, significantly larger for the farms who apply 
standards and, being more than 1 hectare, the average difference is also economically 
substantial. Despite the larger average farm size the households applying standards do not 
use more household labor on the farm, as both farm types employ just above two workers 
from the household, on average, which gives an average household labor share just above 
60%. Even so, a significantly smaller share of the farms that apply standards has off-farm 
employment compared to the non-adopters (about one-in-five of the adopter farms 
compared to one-in-three for the non-adopters).    
 
In terms of location, we also find only minor differences between adopters and non-
adopters of standards. The average distance to the buyer is just below 25 km for the non-
adopters while it is just above that for the adopters. However, the difference is 
statistically insignificant. Another measure of relative isolation (and wealth) is whether 
11 The National poverty line (given by the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs, MOLISA) is 
income based, but it is close to the consumption-based measure given by the General Statistical Office 
(GSO). The MOLISA poverty line was 2.4 million VND per capita for 2005-2010 while it has been 
adjusted to 4.8 million VND per capita for 2011-2015.  
12 The average household size in Dong Thap and Can Tho was 3.9 while it was 4.2 in An Giang in 2010 
according to the VHLSS 2010 (GSO, 2011). 
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the farm household owns a means of transportation. In the MRD, the main means of 
transportation are either a boat or a motorcycle, depending on the location. As seen from 
Table 2, almost all households in the sample have at least one of these. This, however, 
does not imply that the farmers bring the fish to the buyers themselves.        
 
Another characteristic in which we find substantial differences between the two farm 
types is in relation to contractual agreements with processors. Just below half (42%) of 
the farms applying standards have contracts with processing companies, while this is only 
the case for about one-fourth (27%) of the farms not applying standards. This difference 
is important because standards are generally used to overcome information asymmetries 
in food quality and as such, we would expect contracts to be less needed, and thus less 
frequent, among farmers applying standards. However, production contracts cover more 
than fish quality and, as we show later, the largest gain in terms of farmgate price is given 
to farms that have both standards and contracts.  
 
Irrespective of ownership structure we see the highest prevalence of standards in the 75% 
quantile of the expenditure distribution (Table 3). The occurrence of standards is 
significantly higher in this quantile compared to all other quantiles, except at the median.  
 
Table 3. Prevalence of standards among pangasius farms by expenditure quantile 
 
Quantile (%) 
 0.15 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.85 0.95 
Standards 2.59 2.54 5.43 7.41 1.81 2.90 
Non-standards 13.41 7.25 19.57 17.39 7.97 7.25 
Source: Farmer survey. 
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Figure 2. Differences in the expenditure level between adopters and non-adopters of 
standards by quantile  
Source: Farmer survey. 
 
Although there is no difference in the average consumption levels, we show in Figure 2 
that there are distributional differences between adopters and non-adopters of standards. 
Indeed, the quantile-level differences in favor of farms with standards are especially 
visible for quantiles above the median, where the households who apply standards have 
on average 7% higher consumption expenditure levels.  
 
5. Econometric analysis of welfare effects 
The descriptive analysis illustrates that the average levels of consumption expenditure for 
adopters and non-adopters of standards are very similar, while there may be small 
differences between consumption levels for households in the upper quantiles of the 
expenditure distribution. Clearly, this does not imply that standards have no impact on 
expenditures or that it only affects expenditures for the better-off pangasius farmers. 
Therefore, we test econometrically the impact of applying standards on consumption 
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expenditure. As illustrated in Tables 1 and 2, farms applying standards are not randomly 
distributed in the sample (or the population): The prevalence of standards is higher for 
estate farms than household-owned farms, for farms with production contracts and it is 
positively associated with the education of the farm operator.  
(a) Econometric specification 
A common approach to impact evaluation based on cross-section data like ours is to 
assume independence of the outcome and the treatment conditional on observables.13  
This assumption leads to impact estimation using either standard (OLS) regression or 
matching (see, e.g. Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). The list of observable covariates is 
hard to specify precisely, in particular in our setting in which we seek to estimate the 
impact on consumption expenditure, but most of the variables given in Table 2 are 
common controls in expenditure models. Thus, apart from aquaculture area, which is 
endogenous as application of standards requires changes in the pond size, we will control 
for the variables given in Table 2. 
 
To estimate the impact of applying standards on the wellbeing of pangasius farmers, we 
formulate a simple reduced form model for consumption expenditure in which 
expenditure depends on farm characteristics. Even though the list of observed 
characteristics is extensive, the decision to adopt standards is inherently based on 
unobservable farm and farmer characteristics including the specific location relative to 
the river, managerial skills, and social network ties with other farmers and processors. 
Hence, in order to reduce bias while estimating the causal effect of standards, we will 
also apply instrumental variable regression, which can be formulated as a two-equation 
model with a selection equation determining if a farmer is applying standards and an 
outcome equation describing consumption expenditure. Specifically, we may formulate 
this as: 
 
Si = π0 + π1Zi +γXi + ηi     (1) 
Yi = α + δSi + βXi + εi     (2) 
13 Maertens and Swinnen (2009) is a relevant example.  
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 where per capita consumption expenditure in household i is denoted Yi. The observable 
farm characteristics are gathered in the vector Xi while the unobserved farm 
characteristics are gathered in εi. The impact of adoption of food standards is included in 
the model by the indicator variable Si, taking the value 1 if household i applies standards 
and 0 of the household has traditional production. Being endogenous, application of 
standards is determined in the selection equation (1) in which we introduce instrumental 
variables, Zi, for individual household adoption of food standards.  
 
Finding admissible and relevant instruments for income generating decisions in 
consumption models is not easy. In previous studies Asfaw et al. (2010b) used the 
predicted probability of adoption of EurepGAP standard as an instrument for food 
standard adoption, while Bolwig et al. (2009) used the ratio of non-farm income to total 
revenue in an impact evaluation of organic certification. The admissibility of both of 
these instruments can be debated, which is why we take a different route.  
 
Based on insights from the technology adoption literature we think of network and 
information variables as good candidates for valid and relevant instruments.14 However, 
measuring knowledge and information is notoriously difficult so we revert to two crude 
indicators of knowledge. As one measure, we generate a village level indicator variable 
that takes the value 1 if at least one farm in the village applies standards. By this, we 
assume that specific production knowledge spreads more easily within villages (friends 
and neighbors) than across villages. Further, by restricting the instrument to village level 
information we seek to avoid, or at least reduce, the correlation with unobservable 
individual farmer characteristics such as managerial skills. 
 
Our second measure is more direct as we use the information about the individual 
farmer’s knowledge about standards from the farmer survey. This instrumental variable 
14 The importance of networks and the efficiency of information flows in the process of new technology 
adoption is emphasized in several studies spanning across different countries (Boahene, Snijders, & 
Folmer, 1999; Conley & Udry, 2010; Matuschke & Qaim, 2009), as well as the livelihood and market 
access literature (Bacon, 2005; Blanc & Kledal, 2012; Suzuki, Jarvis, & Sexton, 2011). 
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takes value 1 if a farmer has ever heard about standards and 0 otherwise. Table 4 shows 
the information we obtained from the survey when we asked about the sources of 
information about food standards. The most frequently mentioned sources are extension 
officers and mass media such as newspapers and TV. Information spread through these 
media is very common in Vietnam. Friends, neighbors and relatives are also frequent 
sources of information, while buyers are rarely mentioned.  
 
Table 4. Main sources of information about standards 
Source  Number Percent 
Magazines/Newspapers/Books 91 33.70 
Friends/Neighbors/Relatives 56 20.74 
NGOs 1 0.37 
Internet 33 12.22 
TV  91 33.70 
Radio  9 3.33 
Government institutions 11 4.07 
Community leader 23 8.52 
Extension officers 126 46.67 
Buyers 14 5.19 
Note: N = 192; multiple options are possible. Source: Farmer survey. 
 
 
In Table 5 we show the associations between application of standards and the two 
knowledge variables. It is clear that no farmers are applying standards without knowing 
about standards, thus there are no instances in which the knowledge variable takes the 
value 0 (no knowledge) when the standards indicator variable takes the value 1 (the 
farmer applies a standard). But there are many farmers who have heard about standards, 
but do not apply the standards (124 farmers) and also many who have not heard about 
and do not apply standards (78 farmers). The distribution of the village-level knowledge 
of standards (emphasizing more specific knowledge) is different as there are fewer 
farmers living in villages in which at least one farmer applies standards that do not apply 
standards themselves (94) compared to the ones who apply (108). 
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Table 5. Associations between standards and the information about standards 
 
Not applying standards 
(0) 
 
Applying standards 
(1) 
Knowledge 
variable  
IV1 
Village-level 
standards 
IV2 
Heard about 
standards 
 
IV1 
Village-level 
standards 
IV2 
Heard about 
standards 
No (0) 94 78 
 
0 0 
Yes (1) 108 124 
 
68 68 
Note: The Pearson χ2(1) test of independence between applying standards and IV1 (village-level 
application of standards) is 48.54 (p < 0.0001). The value of the Pearson χ 2(1) test of independence 
between applying standards and IV2 (heard about standards) is 36.92 (p < 0.0001). Source: Farmer survey. 
 
Ideally, the knowledge of standards should be randomly distributed across the pangasius 
farmers in the region. In that case this information could be used to obtain the intent to 
treat effect of standards. However, the distributions are not independent of farm 
characteristics but we assume they are conditionally independent of consumption 
expenditure. This means that we both expect and allow for knowledge to depend on 
observable farm and farmer characteristics such as education, location (province and 
distance to buyer) and other observables, but we expect knowledge to be randomly 
distributed among farmers with equal characteristics, and we further assume that this 
information has no independent impact on consumption expenditure. These assumptions 
are the basis for using the knowledge variables as instruments in our impact assessment. 
Using the instruments in 2SLS regressions, our impact estimator corresponds to a Local 
Average Treatment Effect (LATE). 15 The LATE is the effect of treatment for those 
whose treatment status is changed by the instrument(s), termed the compliers in Angrist 
et al. (1996).  
 
As the main objective of our study is to show that the impact of standards is not uniform 
across the expenditure distribution, we expand the instrumental variable regression model 
to quantiles of the expenditure distribution. Specifically, we estimate quantile regressions 
in which expenditure is conditional on the covariates, 𝑋𝑖, and we use the knowledge 
variables as instrument(s) for individual household food standard adoption:16 
 
15 Imbens and Angrist (1994) and also Abadie et al. (2002) state that if the key IV assumptions are fulfilled, 
any observed relationship between the treatment and the outcome has a causal interpretation for compliers. 
16 We use the STATA ivqte routine developed by Frölich and Melly (2010). 
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Qθ(Yi |Xi, Zi) = αθ + δθSi + βθXi,    (3) 
 
where Qθ(Yi |Xi, Zi) denotes the θ-quantile of Yi given Xi, and Si for compliers. The 
instrumental variable quantile regressions require linearity of the consumption model and 
a set of more technical assumptions given in Abadie et al. (2002). Given linearity, the 
assmptions are, however, only slightly more restrictive than the usual assumptions in 
propensity score matching. 
(b) Econometric results 
The results for the average impact of food standards on farmers’ wellbeing are presented 
in Table 6, while the quantile impact estimates are given in Table 7. The complete sets of 
estimated parameters for the regressions in Table 6 are given in Tables A3, A4 and A5 in 
the Appendix. 
 
Table 6. Average impact of standards on consumption expenditure 
Estimator OLS 2SLS IV1 2SLS IV2 2SLS IV1 and IV2 
Full sample 0.180* 0.443* 0.696* 0.558** 
(0.104) (0.257) (0.420) (0.241) 
Farms smaller than 1.2 haa -0.199 0.381 -0.197 0.093 
(0.156) (0.441) (0.620) (0.422) 
Farms larger than 1.2 ha 0.490** 0.452 1.530*** 0.838*** 
(0.195) (0.327) (0.462) (0.259) 
Note: IV1: village-level standards; IV2: heard about standards. Full regression results are given in Tables 
A3, A4 and A5. The full sample results have 270 observations; the split sample results each have 135 
observations. a The median farm size in the sample is 1.2 hectares. Robust bootstrapped standard errors 
clustered at the commune level in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: Farmer survey. 
 
The first result in Table 6 is that when conditioning on observables, the estimated average 
impact of standards is an increase in per capita consumption just below 20%. The effect 
is not precisely determined and it is only marginally significant at the 10 percent level. 
Accounting for the possible endogeneity of food standard adoption, the three 2SLS 
regressions yield average impact estimates from 0.443, corresponding to an increase in 
consumption of 56% (using the instrument that at least one farm in the village is applying 
standards) to 0.696 corresponding to an increase in consumption of 100% (using the 
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instrument that the farmer has heard about standards). Including both instruments results 
in an estimate in between the two. Thus the 2SLS regressions show impacts that are more 
than twice the size of the corresponding OLS coefficient. This result is stable across all 
our model formulations, which is why we discuss it in more detail in the next section. 
 
As a first illustration of the heterogeneous impacts of standards on consumption 
expenditure we split the sample of farmers according to farm size. To avoid specification 
searches we simply split the sample in half, and this corresponds to a sample of 135 
farmers with farm sizes less than 1.2 hectares and 135 famers with farm sizes of at least 
1.2 hectares. The average impact estimates are given in Table 6 below the full sample 
estimates. For the small farms, we obtain a negative point estimate in the OLS regression 
and in one of the 2SLS regressions, but the estimates are statistically insignificant 
throughout. Thus we find no impact of standards on small farms. In contrast, the impact 
is substantial and statistically significant for the sub-sample of large farms. This is 
interesting in light of the distribution of application of standards across ownership and 
farm size in Table 1. The results indicate that small, household-owned farms do not gain 
from applying standards.  
 
The first stage regression estimates in Table A4 in the Appendix show that the weak 
instrument hypothesis is easily rejected in all three 2SLS regressions as the F-statistic 
values surpass the critical values given in Stock and Yogo (2005). Also, we show in 
Table A3 that Hansen J-test for overidentification when both instruments are used in the 
estimation does not lead us to reject the hypothesis of valid instruments. 
 
In Table 7 we assess the distributional differences in the impact of standards in a more 
systematic way by estimating the local average impact at the 15%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 85% 
and 95% quantiles of the expenditure distribution. The specification of the quantile 
regressions is exactly as the least squares and 2SLS regressions in Table 6. We report 
results of both standard quantile regressions, corresponding to the OLS results in Table 6, 
and instrumental variable quantile regressions, corresponding to the two first 2SLS 
regressions in Table 6.  
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 Table 7. Local average impact at different quantiles of the expenditure distribution 
 Quantile (%) 
 15 25 50 75 85 95 
QR 0.215 0.254* 0.106 0.085 0.089 -0.073 
 (0.159) (0.142) (0.126) (0.194) (0.225) (0.342) 
IVQR1 0.086 0.275 0.786*** 0.805** 0.890** 0.495 
 (0.246) (0.208) (0.220) (0.349) (0.348) (0.409) 
IVQR2 0.158 0.219 0.483** 0.507* 0.034 0.036 
 (0.266) (0.197) (0.216) (0.259) (0.401) (0.586) 
IV1 validity (t-value) 0.71 1.07 0.95 0.59 1.21 0.12 
IV2 validity (t-value) 1.24 0.71 1.49 2.04** 1.20 0.09 
Note: QR: quantile regression; IVQR1: instrumental variable quantile regression with IV1 (village-level 
application of standards); IVQR2: instrumental variable quantile regression with IV2 (heard about 
standards). The control variables are the same as in Table 6. Validity of instrumental variables was assessed 
using a Sargan-type regression where the instrumental variables are used as controls. Robust bootstrapped 
standard errors clustered at the commune level in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: 
Farmer survey. 
 
The standard quantile regressions show small and statistically insignificant effects of 
standards on consumption expenditure, apart from a marginally significant impact at the 
25% quantile. The point estimates are largest for the poorer households and they decline 
somewhat as we move towards the richest households. The instrumental variable results 
are quite different as the estimated impact is both large and statistically significant for the 
upper middle class defined as the 50-85% quantiles of the consumption expenditure 
distribution. The two instruments give quantitatively different results, as expected, but the 
profiles of the impact across the expenditure distribution are similar: The local effect is 
large (and significant) at the median and the upper quantile while it is low (and 
insignificant) below the median and at the upper tail of the distribution. Overall, Table 7 
indicates that the gain from standards is an increase in consumption expenditure of about 
60% or more for the upper middle class while there is no gain for the poorest. This result 
finds support in the estimation on the sample split by the median farm size in Table 6. 
 
In Table 7 we also show results for a test of validity of instrumental variables using a 
Sargan-type regression where the instrumental variables are included as controls 
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alongside the other controls and the (endogenous) indicator of application of standards. 
The t-test of the instrument is the Sargan-type test of validity. The test does not lead us to 
suspect an individual (direct) effect of the instruments on consumption expenditure 
although the second instrument has a marginally significant effect on consumption at the 
75% quantile. However, given the number of individual tests this is not unexpected and 
we do not think of this as strong evidence against the validity of our instruments.  
 
6. Discussion 
The estimated impacts of food standards are substantial – for the upper middle-class. 
Consumption expenditure increases of 60-140% appear excessive and one may also ask 
why the local average impact is smaller, and insignificant, for the wealthiest farmers. 
 
Clearly, if standards are to increase income and consumption they must either increase 
the revenue or reduce costs of production. For pangasius, standards signal both superior 
product quality and reduced quality uncertainty. The most obvious gain from application 
of standards is therefore higher farm-gate prices. In Figure 3 we show the distribution of 
farmgate prices for 172 farmers who have reported this price (128 of these farmers did 
not apply standards while the remaining 44 did). The interesting observations with regard 
to the farmgate prices are that the prices vary substantially (by a factor of 3) and that the 
ranges of prices for pangasius produced traditionally and under standards are almost 
equal. Thus, although the average farmgate price is 11% (2,130 VND/kg) higher when 
producing under standards, there are many farmers with traditional production who 
receive a high price. The higher price in standard-led production is most likely a 
consequence of better quality.  
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Figure 3. Distribution of farm-gate prices for farms with and without standards 
Source: Farmer survey. 
 
In Table 8 we report group means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum for the 
farmgate prices by application of standards, ownership, and contractual arrangement with 
processors. The highest average price is given to household farmers with both a contract 
and standards, while the second highest price is given to estate farms with both a contract 
and standards. Hence, there is little doubt that food standards are associated with higher 
prices. However, ownership and contractual arrangements blur the simple relationship 
because estate farms actually obtain high prices, on average, also without standards and 
even without contracts. Moreover, the household farms producing under standards but 
without a contract actually get a fairly low price, on average, which is comparable to the 
average prices obtained for households that do not apply standards. Furthermore, while 
the household-owned farms that do not apply standards have the lowest average price, the 
price range is wide and the highest prices given to these farmers are actually above the 
highest prices given to farms that apply standards, but do not have contractual 
arrangement with processors. Thus, a switch from traditional production to applying 
standards is unlikely to be associated with a higher farmgate price for many households, 
in particular if the household farm does not also have a contract.  
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 Table 8. Summary statistics for the farmgate prices by standards, ownership and 
contractual arrangement 
Standards Ownership Contract N Average price s Min Max 
No Household No 46 18,260 3,455 14,000 29,000 
No Household Yes 41 18,857 3,469 14,650 27,000 
No Estate No 21 20,067 3,771 14,700 28,500 
No Estate Yes 20 20,190 3,007 14,500 26,500 
Yes Estate No 4 19,875 3,400 16,500 24,500 
Yes Estate Yes 15 21,380 4,096 15,000 28,500 
Yes Household No 11 18,641 2,930 15,500 24,000 
Yes Household Yes 14 23,386 4,044 16,500 28,400 
Source: Farmer survey 
 
This may explain why the selection bias is negative, leading to larger impact estimates in 
the IV-regressions compared to just conditioning on observables. Skilled, or well-
connected farmers may not apply standards because they do not need to, as they already 
produce high quality fish and obtain high prices. In this case, adoption of standards is 
negatively correlated with the error term in the regressions because it is, conditionally, 
the relatively less capable farmers who apply standards, thereby signaling high quality to 
the processors. It also explains why the wealthiest farmers do not apply standards, if these 
are also the most capable farmers. To reaffirm this, we show in Table A6 in the Appendix 
that farmers in the top quantile of the expenditure distribution are more prone to consider 
standards as impractical compared to farmers in other quantiles. In addition, farmers in 
the top quantile appear to be more cost sensitive than farmers in other quantiles as the 
main reasons for not adopting standards in this quantile were high costs for establishment 
upgrade, consultancy and certification. Using the instrumental variables based on 
knowledge and information, we estimate the local average effect of switching to 
standards for farmers with (conditionally) average capabilities and for these farmers, the 
gains are evidently large.  
 
To supplement the regression-based results, we add information on the motivation of 
farmers to start applying standards across quantiles. Table A7 in the Appendix tells that 
the farmers who apply standards in the top quantile are, just as the farmers in other 
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quantiles, motivated to apply standards in order to improve market reach and obtain 
higher product price. All groups of farmers stated that the main reason for applying 
standards is to improve product quality. Still, farmers in the top quantile are the only 
group stating that they do not expect to reduce the occurrence of fish diseases with the 
application of standards. This reaffirms our point that these farmers are probably better 
able to manage production of pangasius. However, there is an upper bound to which the 
increase in quality is reflected in price and the application of standards ceases to have 
effect. Indeed, farmers who apply standards in the top quantile do not receive much 
higher price compared to the non-applicants (t = 0.91), which may additionally explain 
why the gain from standards is not significant in this quantile.  
 
For the poorer farmers, the small and insignificant impact of standards on consumption 
expenditure must have another explanation. Lacking information about investment costs 
we can only speculate about the underlying cause, but one reason could be that poorer 
farmers may have difficulty in inferring returns from the new technology (Munshi, 2004), 
or they may face specific constraints, such as restrictions in the capital market, which 
prevent adoption. In a study on the adoption of a new hybrid maize variety, Suri (2011) 
finds that farmers with the highest estimated gross returns do not use the new variety. 
Instead, their returns are correlated with high costs of acquiring the technology due to 
supply constraints associated with poor infrastructure. The farmers in our sample have 
most frequently stated that too high costs of implementation (41% of non-applicants) and 
lack of competences (37% of non-applicants) are the key inhibiting factors for the 
implementation of standards. This lends support to both explanations. 
 
Even though we have both a different outcome measure and use different estimation 
methods, our results seem comparable to Asfaw et al. (2010b) who find an increase in net 
production revenue of around 60% for Kenyan farmers that have adopted the EurepGAP 
standard. Our results are also comparable to impact estimates in Maertens and Swinnen 
(2009) showing 60-110% increases in income from participation in French bean export 
production. But, direct comparisons of the size of the estimated impact of food standards 
on farmers’ wellbeing in this paper with the size of the impact in other papers are not 
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straightforward. First, our 2SLS results determine local average treatment effects, which 
are sensitive to the choice of instrument, as we illustrate. But, the instrument itself does 
not always highlight which subset of the population it affects (Heckman, 1997), so it is 
usually not possible to know who is induced to adopt standards by an instrument. In 
addition, the two comparable studies, using propensity scores (Maertens & Swinnen, 
2009) and exclusion restrictions (Asfaw et al., 2010b) are most likely also estimating a 
local average treatment effect (LATE) instead of the average treatment effect (ATE). 
Second, previous studies have measured the impact of standards on household income 
(Maertens & Swinnen, 2009) and net income from export vegetables (Asfaw et al., 
2010b). We, however, focus on consumption expenditure because i) imprecisions in 
inferring the true income level often arise from the inability to measure all types of costs 
borne by the households, especially differing investment costs and loan interest rates; and 
ii) comparing household-owned and estate farms in terms of income is not reasonable 
because companies, not estate farm employees invest on these farms. Comparing the 
income levels would then overestimate the welfare effect of food standards on the estate 
farms.  
7. Conclusion 
Using cross-sectional farm household data collected in the Vietnamese pangasius sector 
in 2011, we estimate the impact of food standards on farmers’ wellbeing, measured by 
consumption expenditure per adult equivalent. The impact of standards is estimated at the 
mean and at selected quantile levels. Because the adoption of food standards is partly 
determined by farm specific unobservable factors that also influence consumption we use 
instrumental variable regressions to estimate the causal effect of food standard adoption.  
 
Our results show that the additional effort in terms of modified production practices and 
use of improved inputs pays off for the applicants of standards as we find a positive 
overall impact of standards on farmers’ wellbeing. Thus, on average, one should expect 
pangasius farms that apply standards to be better off than comparable farms with 
traditional production. This suggests not only that investment in food standards is 
necessary in modern value chains, but also that this investment can lead to subsequent 
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financial gains. However, the impact of standards on farmers’ wellbeing is 
heterogeneous. We find that only households at higher levels in the expenditure 
distribution who have opted for the application of food standards get significant benefits.  
 
While we expected to find a homogeneous positive effect of standards for richer farmers, 
i.e. the farmers beyond the median consumption level, our findings surprisingly show that 
the wealthiest farmers (top 15%) do not gain from standards. This finding illustrates that 
standards are not as useful to the wealthiest farmers with an established market position 
as to the middle-class farmers. Clearly, the specificities of cultural and business 
environment are successfully employed by the richest farmers to circumvent the 
requirements for standards.  
 
Our impact estimates do not include indirect distributional effects such as general 
equilibrium effects via the labor market. Therefore, while we can only infer that 
standards are directly beneficial for the upper middle-class, we cannot conclude that the 
poorest farms are, or will be, marginalized. Further, our analysis does not allow a fine-
tuned evaluation of the kinds of interpersonal and business relationships that can be 
especially conducive to participating in high-value export sector and benefiting from 
standards. Such analysis could potentially include surveying farmers, processing 
companies and exporters. Further research comprising repeated surveys would be needed 
to look into long-term effects of standard adoption among small-scale farmers. 
 
Still, our results bear significance for development policies because they indicate that 
standards can be a strategic tool in rural sector development, but care needs to be directed 
towards small-scale farmers, probably through financial and technical assistance. In case 
of the Vietnamese pangasius farmers, better credit options and training are most likely 
desirable, together with organizational and business development. Group certification of 
small farmers has been a solution to high cost of certification in other countries but such 
an option needs to be evaluated against cultural, social, and political conditions in 
Vietnam.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Overview of qualitative interviews 
Category  Selection criteria An 
Giang 
Can 
Tho 
Dong 
Thap 
Ho Chi 
Minh City 
Total  
Input 
supplier 
Supplying inputs, such as fry, 
fingerlings, feed, supplements and 
veterinary medicines to pangasius farms 
0 1 3 1 5 
Farmer Owning or working on a pangasius farm, 
applying or not applying standards 
0 1 6 0 7 
Processor Employed for a processing company in 
managing, technical or quality assurance 
positions 
8 3 3 0 14 
Exporter Employed for international trading 
companies 
1 1 1 2 5 
Service 
providers 
Providing various kinds of support to the 
sector, e.g. financial services, 
consultancy, development projects, 
certification 
0 3 1 4 8 
Government Staff at different levels of provincial or 
commune-level governance responsible 
for pangasius sector 
0 5 3 0 8 
Researcher Representing various research 
institutions and universities who are 
involved in research on pangasius sector 
0 3 0 2 5 
Total   9 17 17 9 52 
Source: Interviews. 
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Table A2. Description of key farmer and household variables 
Variable  Description  
Yearly 
consumption 
expenditure  
and   
Per capita 
yearly 
expenditure 
Household consumption spending on all goods and services including consumption 
from own production, valued at local selling prices. The respondents were asked to 
recall their daily expenditure on food, drinking and smoking, their monthly expenses for 
water, electricity and telephone and their yearly expenditure on clothing, education, 
healthcare, transport, house rent and festivities. The consumption expenditure categories 
are based on the consumption expenditure items used in the Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Survey (GSO, 2011). The questionnaire contained enough space for naming 
other relevant expenses in case the list of specific items was not sufficiently 
comprehensive. The other relevant expenses identified by farmers from the sample 
include transfer payments, such as social contributions and interest payments, though 
these only account for a small fraction of total spending (around 3% of total yearly 
expenditure). All expenses are aggregated to represent the consumption indicator of the 
living standard over the year as used by the VHLSS and World Bank’s living standard 
measurement surveys (LSMS). Per capita consumption expenditure is calculated using 
the OECD adult equivalence scale (OECD, 2009). 
Standards A binary indicator taking the value 1 if a household stated that they have certified 
against any of the international standards in pangasius production (GlobalGAP, BAP 
and SQF1000) and 0 otherwise. 
Farm size  The total size of the farm including production land (both aquaculture and agriculture) 
and residential area that is owned or rented by the household (measured in ha).  
Aquaculture 
area  
The total pond surface used for pangasius production in hectares, including both owned 
and rented area.  
Household size The number of household members as defined by the Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Survey (GSO, 2011). 
Dependency 
ratio 
The share of household members under the age of 15 and over the age of 64. 
Age  Age of the household head or farm operator. 
Education  Years of schooling, obtained from the information about the highest grade attained.  
Household 
labor  
Number of household members working full or part time on the farm. 
Household 
labor share 
Share of household members working on a farm. 
Off-farm 
employment 
A binary indicator variable taking the value 1 if the household has income from off-
farm employment and 0 otherwise.  
Distance to 
buyer 
Distance between the farm and the buyer in kilometers.  
Own transport A binary indicator variable taking the value 1 if a household owns a boat or a motorbike 
and 0 otherwise. 
Estate farm A binary indicator variable taking the value 1 if the farm is partly owned by a 
processing company and the company’s ownership share is 50% or more, and 0 
otherwise.  
Contract with a 
processing 
company 
A binary indicator variable taking the value 1 if the farmer has been working with a 
processing company under a contract during the previous production year and 0 
otherwise.  
Average 
farmgate price  
The average price at which the farmer sold pangasius in 2010. 
Source: Farmer survey 
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Table A3. Average impact of standards on per capita expenditure (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS 2SLS IV1 2SLS IV2 2SLS IV1 and IV2 
Standards 0.180* 0.443* 0.696* 0.558** 
 (0.104) (0.257) (0.420) (0.241) 
Farm size 0.191*** 0.185*** 0.179*** 0.182*** 
 (0.054) (0.052) (0.048) (0.050) 
Household size -0.054 -0.060 -0.065 -0.062 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.039) 
Dependency ratio 0.217 0.230* 0.243* 0.236* 
 (0.137) (0.136) (0.125) (0.131) 
Age  0.011** 0.011** 0.010* 0.010** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Education  0.045*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Household labor share 0.145** 0.153*** 0.161*** 0.157*** 
 (0.057) (0.053) (0.056) (0.054) 
Off-farm employment  -0.147 -0.127 -0.107 -0.118 
 (0.140) (0.134) (0.154) (0.142) 
Distance to buyer (log) -0.085** -0.094*** -0.103** -0.098*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.037) 
Own transport 0.001 -0.047 -0.093 -0.068 
 (0.308) (0.276) (0.315) (0.291) 
Estate farm 0.167 0.142 0.118 0.131 
 (0.181) (0.176) (0.181) (0.176) 
Contract 0.007 -0.018 -0.042 -0.029 
 (0.097) (0.090) (0.094) (0.089) 
An Giang 0.478*** 0.518*** 0.557*** 0.536*** 
 (0.163) (0.152) (0.172) (0.158) 
Can Tho 0.261 0.268 0.275 0.271 
 (0.298) (0.276) (0.273) (0.275) 
Constant 14.08*** 14.15*** 14.22*** 14.18*** 
 (0.51) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) 
N 270 270 270 270 
R2 0.236 0.224 0.192 0.212 
Hansen J-test  
p-value 
   0.277  
(0.599) 
Note: IV1: village-level standards; IV2: heard about standards. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
commune level in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: Farmer survey. 
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Table A4. First stage regressions: dependent variable is application of standards 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Farm size 0.028 0.028 0.032 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.021) 
Household size 0.014 0.036*** 0.028*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Dependency ratio -0.036 -0.074* -0.057 
 (0.047) (0.042) (0.049) 
Age  0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education  0.009 0.002 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Household labor share -0.002 -0.015 0.008 
 (0.040) (0.045) (0.034) 
Off-farm employment  -0.037 -0.058 -0.025 
 (0.043) (0.050) (0.038) 
Distance to buyer (log) 0.016 0.022 0.007 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Own transport 0.081 0.189** 0.096 
 (0.076) (0.075) (0.080) 
Estate farm 0.113* 0.101 0.116* 
 (0.058) (0.063) (0.058) 
Contract 0.082 0.026 0.022 
 (0.059) (0.065) (0.051) 
An Giang -0.145** -0.221*** -0.206*** 
 (0.055) (0.050) (0.057) 
Can Tho 0.077 -0.045 0.051 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.051) 
IV1 0.372***  0.335*** 
 (0.041)  (0.041) 
IV2  0.374*** 0.331*** 
  (0.047) (0.047) 
Constant -0.38** -0.41** -0.49*** 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.13) 
N 270 270 270 
R2 0.264 0.242 0.362 
K-P LM statistic  53.48 46.33 70.07 
K-P Wald F-statistic 79.43 70.30 49.29 
Note: IV1: village-level standards; IV2: heard about standards. K-P LM and K-P Wald are the Kleibergen-
Paap LM and Wald test statistics for weak instruments. Robust standard errors clustered at the commune 
level in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: Farmer survey. 
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Table A5. Average impact of standards on per capita expenditure (log): sample split by 
farm size 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Below median farm size (1.2ha)  At and above median farm size (1.2ha) 
 IV1 IV2 IV1 and IV2  IV1 IV2 IV1 and IV2 
Standards 0.381 -0.197 0.093  0.452 1.530*** 0.838*** 
 (0.441) (0.620) (0.422)  (0.327) (0.462) (0.259) 
Farm size 0.061 0.080 0.070  0.237** 0.213* 0.228** 
 (0.150) (0.143) (0.145)  (0.106) (0.120) (0.109) 
Household size -0.075 -0.064 -0.069  -0.053 -0.075* -0.061 
(0.090) (0.089) (0.090)  (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) 
Dependency 
ratio 
-0.436 -0.490 -0.463  0.301*** 0.340*** 0.315*** 
(0.377) (0.299) (0.331)  (0.089) (0.078) (0.081) 
Age  0.013** 0.013*** 0.013***  0.009 0.006 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Education  0.034** 0.033** 0.033**  0.045* 0.021 0.036 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) 
Household 
labor share 
0.083 0.072 0.077  0.177*** 0.199** 0.185*** 
(0.192) (0.189) (0.183)  (0.064) (0.088) (0.069) 
Off-farm 
employment  
-0.124 -0.207 -0.165  0.004 -0.004 0.001 
(0.187) (0.228) (0.204)  (0.186) (0.221) (0.189) 
Distance to 
buyer (log) 
-0.066*** -0.052 -0.059**  -0.120* -0.165** -0.136** 
(0.024) (0.033) (0.027)  (0.061) (0.070) (0.062) 
Own transport -0.126 0.044 -0.041  0.003 -0.102 -0.035 
 (0.206) (0.257) (0.208)  (0.466) (0.504) (0.472) 
Estate farm 0.015 0.043 0.029  0.187 0.096 0.154 
 (0.155) (0.162) (0.154)  (0.269) (0.290) (0.271) 
Contract 0.014 0.076 0.045  0.006 -0.105 -0.034 
 (0.117) (0.170) (0.137)  (0.165) (0.157) (0.149) 
An Giang 0.755*** 0.631** 0.693***  0.305 0.432** 0.350* 
 (0.184) (0.257) (0.210)  (0.205) (0.217) (0.205) 
Can Tho 0.200 0.194 0.197  0.345 0.371 0.354 
 (0.219) (0.174) (0.195)  (0.516) (0.465) (0.494) 
Constant 14.38*** 14.30*** 14.34***  14.01*** 14.41*** 14.15*** 
 (0.45) (0.46) (0.44)  (0.76) (0.73) (0.72) 
N 135 135 135  135 135 135 
R2 0.114 0.192 0.172  0.226 0.070 0.209 
K-P LM 
statistic 
20.29 22.61 27.99  32.84 19.95 38.66 
K-P Wald F-
statistic 
26.94 29.61 17.71  55.68 34.25 30.70 
Hansen J-test 
p-value 
  0.753 
(0.386) 
   2.849 
(0.091) 
Note: IV1: village-level standards; IV2: heard about standards. K-P LM and K-P Wald are the Kleibergen-
Paap LM and Wald test statistics for weak instruments. Robust standard errors clustered at the commune 
level in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: Farmer survey. 
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Table A6. Frequency of responses for not adopting food standards 
   Quantile (%)    
Reasons for not adopting standards 15 25 50 75 85 95 
Lack of competence/experience 0.33 0.14 0.50 0.32 0.55 0.44 
Impracticality  0.17 0.14 0.19 0.28 0.09 0.33 
No consultancy capacity  0.08 0.29 0.08 0.12 
 
0.11 
Not aware of benefits  0.08 0.29 0.31 0.08 0.09 0.22 
Costs of consultancy  0.17 
 
0.08 0.08 0.09 0.33 
Not demanded locally 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.08 
 
0.11 
Not demanded in foreign markets    0.04   
No management commitment   0.04    
Low commercial return 0.08 0.14 
 
0.04 
 
0.11 
It takes long time to obtain certificate 0.08  0.04 0.08   
Establishment upgrade costs  0.50 0.43 0.42 0.32 0.55 0.67 
Cost of certification  0.17 0.14 0.08 0.28 0.45 0.22 
Do not need  0.14 0.08    
Farm not suitable 
 
0.14 0.04 
   Financially constrained 0.17 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.27 
 New farm (too early for standards)     0.09  
Number of farmers per quantile if S=0 12 7 26 25 11 9 
Note: Table reports the most important reasons for adopting standards for household-owned farms. Farmers 
first responded to the question: Why did you decide against standard implementation? after which they 
chose three most important reasons for not adopting standards, 1 being the most important reason and 3 
being the least important. Table reports the frequency of motives for adopting standards divided by the 
number of farmers in each quantile. Source: Farmer survey. 
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Table A7. The most important reasons for adopting food standards 
 Quantile (%) 
Reasons for adopting standards 15 25 50 75 85 95 
To increase export   1 1 1 1 
To enhance product quality 1 1 1 1 1 1 
To meet international market requirements  1 1 1  1 
To sell in better-paying markets 1 1 1 1  1 
To decrease occurrence of fish diseases 1 1 1 1 1  
To meet domestic client requirements  1 1 1   
To sell at higher price    1 1 1 
To improve reputation    1   
To reduce production costs   1    
Note: The Table reports the most important reasons for adopting standards. Farmers first responded to the 
question: Why did you decide to start applying standards in your production? after which they chose three 
most important reasons for adopting standards, 1 being the most important reason and 3 being the least 
important. The Table reports the motives that were chosen as the most important at least once. Source: 
Farmer survey. 
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